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153 
MAHR PROVISIONS AND THE CASE FOR SHARI’A 
ARBITRATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The global Muslim population is currently estimated at 1.8 billion 
people, comprising twenty-four percent of the total global population.1 The 
United States alone is home to 3.45 million Muslim individuals.2 Further, 
both global and national Muslim populations are predicted to grow rapidly 
over the next half-century.3 The Pew Research Foundation predicts that 
between 2015 and 2060, the global Muslim population will grow over twice 
as fast as the overall world population4 and that by 2050, the Muslim 
population in America will reach 8.1 million.5 These changes would make 
Muslims the second-largest religious group in the United States6 and the 
largest religious group in the world by the second half of this century.7 
Yet, from a legal standpoint, American courts are still not familiar with 
many aspects of Islamic legal and cultural traditions. Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the context of Islamic marriage. Marriage is a particularly 
complex area of family law because it is not singularly a civil matter, but 
instead a fusion of legal rules, religious practices, and socio-cultural 
expectations and norms.8 Judicial interpretations in United States courts of 
Islamic marriage contracts reflect this complexity. 
In particular, U.S. courts struggle to interpret provisions within Islamic 
marriage contracts, called mahr provisions, which regulate the division of 
                                                      
1. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE CHANGING GLOBAL RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 8 (Apr. 5, 2017), 
http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/04/07092755/FULL-REPORT-WITH-
APPENDIXES-A-AND-B-APRIL-3.pdf [http://perma.cc/7PA9-33LK]. This makes the Muslim 
population the second largest religious group in the world. Id. Only the global Christian population, 
measured at 2.3 billion people and comprising 31.2% of the total global population, is larger. Id. The 
third largest group is religious “nones” (those who are unaffiliated with any religion) with 1.2 billion 
people (16% of the global population) followed by Hindus with 1.1 billion people (15.1% of the global 
population). Id. 
2. BESHEER MOHAMED, PEW RESEARCH CTR., NEW ESTIMATES SHOW U.S. MUSLIM 
POPULATION CONTINUES TO GROW (Jan. 3, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/01/03/new-estimates-show-u-s-muslim-population-continues-to-grow/  
[http://perma.cc/2FNP-A2NJ]. 
3. MICHAEL LIPKA & CONRAD HACKETT, PEW RESEARCH CTR., WHY MUSLIMS ARE THE 
WORLD’S FASTEST-GROWING RELIGIOUS GROUP (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/04/06/why-muslims-are-the-worlds-fastest-growing-religious-group/ 
[https://perma.cc/X4D8-5GN5]; MOHAMED, supra note 2. 
4. LIPKA & HACKETT, supra note 3. 
5. MOHAMED, supra note 2. 
6. Id. 
7. LIPKA & HACKETT, supra note 3. 
8. See Ann Lacquer Estin, Unofficial Family Law, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A 
MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT 92, 93 (Joel A. Nichols ed., 2012). 
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property in the case of certain types of divorce.9 This confusion is due in 
large part to a misunderstanding of the context and function of the mahr, 
leading courts to either invalidate these provisions blanketly or otherwise 
improperly treat mahr agreements as prenuptial contracts.10 Another 
common issue presents itself when parties seek enforcement of a mahr 
agreement that was part of a divorce obtained outside of the United States, 
specifically when the divorce was achieved through the unilateral method 
of talaq.11 Cases demonstrate a multitude of court outcomes, often 
inconsistent with one another.12 What results is unreliable holdings, unclear 
precedent, a disregard for party intentions, and, ultimately, a perverse 
incentive for either husband or wife (and sometimes both) to seek 
opportunistic enrichment in a court with little knowledge of the cultural and 
religious context of these agreements.13 
This Note suggests that the solution to this chaos is not simply to instruct 
American judges on the intricacies of Islamic law and marriages (although 
that certainly would not worsen the issue). Instead, a pluralist approach to 
Islamic marriages should be adopted, similar to the stance courts have taken 
on Jewish legal arbitration tribunals.14 Under this regime, Islamic arbitrators 
would serve as an alternative to civil courts in resolving conflicts involving 
mahr agreements, under the oversight of secular law.15 This approach would 
not only ensure protection of basic rights, but would also encourage self-
regulation by the religious arbitral body to conform to fundamental civil 
family law principles of due process and equal protection.16 Finally, it would 
recognize and validate that there is more than one conception of marriage 
and divorce within American society.17 
I. ISLAMIC MARRIAGE AND MAHR AGREEMENTS 
In order to properly situate mahr agreements within their cultural 
context, it is important to understand some basic aspects of Islamic law and 
the functioning of Islamic marriages.18 
                                                      
9. See discussion infra Part II.  
10. See infra Section II.A. 
11. See infra Section III.D. 
12. See infra Part II. 
13. See infra Part III. 
14. See infra Section IV.A. 
15. Id. 
16. See infra Part IV.B. 
17. See infra Part IV.C. 
18. Despite the use of the phrases “Islamic law” and “Islamic marriage” in this Note, modern 
Islamic states are far from homogenous. While some amount of generalization is necessary for the sake 
of analysis of the role of mahr agreements, I do not intend to suggest that these generalizations hold true 
in every Islamic marriage. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss1/4
  
 
 
 
 
2018] MAHR PROVISIONS AND THE CASE FOR SHARI’A ARBITRATION 155 
 
 
 
To begin, it is helpful to note a key difference between the importance 
of religious law in Islam as compared to Christianity. As a religious practice, 
Christianity is focused on “doctrinal conformity,” that is, that its followers 
have a particular faith or set of beliefs.19 Thus, “to be a Christian is in large 
part about holding a particular set of beliefs about God, Jesus Christ, and 
salvation.”20 Islam and Judaism, on the other hand, additionally focus on 
“behavioral conformity”21 or, as one author put it, “personal observance.”22 
This includes the fundamental idea that followers of the religion strive to 
engage in “a mode of religious living.”23 The emphasis thus lies not only in 
faith or religious theory, but in daily acts and practices.24 This idea of 
religious living in Islam is embodied in the concept of shari’a, which, 
translated literally, means “a path to water.”25 Although shari’a is often 
thought of in the United States as “Islamic law,” it more accurately “refers 
to the primary way in which humans should relate themselves to God.”26 
Shari’a is operationalized into law by a body of legal theory known as the 
fiqh.27 The fiqh was created by classical Islamic legal theorists as they set 
out to interpret the Quran, the sacred text of Islam believed to have been 
dictated directly to Mohammad by God.28 The fiqh governs most aspects of 
civil law in Islamic countries, including family law and marriages.29 Though 
there are variations within Muslim countries, in many, “the formal 
municipal law closely follows the fiqh on matters of marriage and family.”30 
This strong tie between modern municipal law and the fiqh on domestic 
matters is paralleled by strong support of traditional Islamic family law by 
                                                      
19. See Nathan B. Oman, How to Judge Shari’a Contracts: A Guide to Islamic Marriage 
Agreements in American Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 287, 295 & n.39 (2011). 
20. Id. at 295. 
21. Id. at 295 n.39. 
22. Mustafa Akyol, Sharia’s Winding Path into Modernity, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/opinion/shariahs-winding-path-into-modernity.html. 
23. Oman, supra note 19, at 295 n.39.  
24. Id. at 295 & n.39. 
25. Id. at 296. 
26. Id.   
27. Id. at 296. 
28. Id. at 299. This is reflected in the finding of a 2013 Pew Research Foundation survey which 
found “that most Muslims believe sharia is the revealed word of God rather than a body of law developed 
by men based on the word of God.” PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE WORLD’S MUSLIMS: RELIGION, POLITICS 
AND SOCIETY 41 (Apr. 30, 2013), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/11/2013/04/worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-full-report.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/85KK-TBAC]. Though the distinction may be subtle it is an important nuance in 
understanding the Islamic religion. 
29. See Lindsey E. Blenkhorn, Note, Islamic Marriage Contracts in American Courts: 
Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptials and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 
189, 192–93 (2002).  
30. Oman, supra note 19, at 291. See also JAN MICHIEL OTTO, SHARIA AND NATIONAL LAW IN 
MUSLIM COUNTRIES 19 (2008) (noting that classical sharia has managed to retain influence in family 
and inheritance law).  
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Muslim populations worldwide.31 Though Muslims today are not equally 
comfortable with all aspects of the fiqh, most Muslims who believe that 
shari’a should be the law of the land support adhering to religious family 
law.32 Fewer, for example, support aspects of the fiqh relating to severe 
punishments for criminal acts, such as whippings or cutting off hands.33 
So what does marriage look like under Islamic law?34 Unlike marriage 
in the Christian tradition which is considered a sacrament, or a “sign[] of 
grace,”35 Islamic marriage is fundamentally a contractual arrangement.36 
There are several basic requirements to an Islamic marriage contract. First, 
there must be mutual agreement by the parties.37 This often involves 
negotiations between the groom and the bride’s guardian, or wali, usually 
her father or another male relative.38 As a safeguard to ensuring consent, 
many countries require at least one, or sometimes two witnesses to be 
present.39 However, while the fiqh requires that the bride consent freely to 
the marriage and the marriage contract itself,40 some authors suggest that, 
in reality, even with witnesses present, brides may not always have the 
option to withhold consent.41 Protesting a marriage agreement or terms 
within it may be viewed as disrespectful and could have serious social 
consequences for the bride, including ostracism from her family or, in 
                                                      
31. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 28, at 15. 
32. Id. at 50 (citing statistics that show “broad support for allowing religious judges to adjudicate 
domestic disputes,” including that in seventeen of twenty countries surveyed, at least half of population 
surveyed favored giving religious leaders and judges power to decide family disputes). 
33. Id. at 15. For instance, among Muslims in Jordan who say shari’a should be the law of the 
land, 93% say that religious judges should decide domestic and property disputes while only 57% favor 
corporal punishment for crimes such as theft. Id. at 50–52. For an interesting perspective on why this 
might be, see Linda C. McClain, MARRIAGE PLURALISM IN THE UNITED STATES, in MARRIAGE AND 
DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT supra note 8, at 309, 330–31 (“Calls to preserve religious or 
cultural autonomy often target the family and women’s roles as core features that must be preserved, 
even as other aspects of religion and culture adapt to modernization.”). 
34. Again, with 1.8 billion practicing Muslims in the world and many schools of Islamic theology 
and law, Islamic marriages certainly do not all look the same. This discussion remains an overview of 
some common practices and themes. 
35. Oman, supra note 19, at 300 (quoting CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 320 (2d ed. 
2003)) (alteration in original). 
36. Tracie R. Siddiqui, Interpretation of Islamic Marriage Contracts by American Courts, 41 
FAM. L.Q. 639, 642 (2007). 
37. Siddiqui, supra note 36, at 642. 
38. Nathan B. Oman, Bargaining in the Shadow of God’s Law: Islamic Mahr Contracts and the 
Perils of Legal Specialization, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579, 589 (2010). See also JAMAL J. NASIR, 
THE STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC LAW AND MODERN ISLAMIC LEGISLATION 49–52 (3rd ed. 
2009) (“The general consensus of opinion amongst jurists is that the woman, even of full legal capacity, 
and whether previously married or not, should not conduct her own marriage contract. Only the Hanafi[ 
school—one of the major Sunni Islamic schools of jurisprudence—]differ[s], requiring a guardian to 
conduct a marriage contract only if the woman is of no or limited legal capacity.”). 
39. NASIR, supra note 38, at 31. 
40. Id. 
41. See, e.g., Blenkhorn, supra note 29, at 198. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss1/4
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extreme cases, risk of physical harm.42 These consequences do not stem 
from the tenets of religious Islamic law itself, but rather from the patriarchal 
cultural legacies that existed in most now-Muslim countries, often even 
before Islam was a predominant religion.43 
In addition to mutual consent, a second fundamental element of an 
Islamic marriage contract is the inclusion of a mahr agreement.44 With its 
origins in the Quran itself, the mahr45 is property given to the wife by the 
husband to indicate his willingness to marry as well as his respect for the 
bride.46 Sometimes the mahr is compared to a “bride price” in the Western 
tradition; however, unlike the latter, the mahr is given directly to the wife, 
not to her father or family.47 It can range from a symbolic token to a large 
sum of money, property, a portion of a business, or any other thing of 
value.48 Mahr provisions are typically found within the marriage contract, 
which itself is often a standard one-page, fill-in-the-blank form provided by 
a government, an Islamic family court, or, as may be the case within the 
United States, a local Islamic foundation.49 Parties write their names, 
addresses, and the amount of the mahr, but little else.50 The agreement 
usually contains a boilerplate statement that Islamic law governs the 
contract, but generally does not indicate which of the many schools of 
Islamic law takes precedence.51 
There are two parts of every mahr provision: a prompt (or advanced) 
mahr, given at the time the marriage takes place, and a postponed (or 
deferred) mahr, which the wife receives if the marriage ends by either the 
                                                      
42. Id. at 220. 
43. See generally CHRISTINA JONES-PAULY & ABIR DAJANI TUQAN, WOMEN UNDER ISLAM: 
GENDER, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF ISLAMIC LAW (2011); Women in Pre-Islamic Arabia, MUSLIM 
WOMEN’S LEAGUE (Sept. 1995), http://www.mwlusa.org/topics/history/herstory.html [http://perma.cc/ 
2VGT-5LPS]. 
44. Blenkhorn, supra note 29, at 199. See also Chelsea A. Sizemore, Comment, Enforcing 
Islamic Mahr Agreements: The American Judge’s Interpretational Dilemma, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1085, 1087 (2011).   
45. Also referred to as a nikah, saddaq, or, in English, dower. Blenkhorn, supra note 29, at 212; 
Siddiqui, supra note 36, at 639. 
46. Sizemore, supra note 44, at 1087.   
47. Siddiqui, supra note 36, at 643 & n.1. 
48. Blenkhorn, supra note 29, at 199–200. 
49. Id. at 211. See Appendix for an example of a typical Islamic marriage certificate that includes 
a mahr provision. The example in the Appendix comes from the Islamic Foundation of Greater St. Louis, 
a non-profit serving the local St. Louis Islamic community. About Us, ISLAMIC FOUND. OF GREATER ST. 
LOUIS, INC., https://islamstl.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/W6TH-T2NU] (last visited July 28, 2018). 
50. Blenkhorn, supra note 29, at 211. See marriage certificate in Appendix, in which the mahr 
provision reads:  
“(Saddaq) Advanced: _______  Postponed:_______ Total: _______”. 
51. Blenkhorn, supra note 29, at 211. See marriage certificate in Appendix, which states that the 
bride and groom “of their own free will, agree to be united in marriage under the law of Islam as revealed 
to Prophet Muhammad, son of Abdullah and as contained in the Qur’an and Hadith.” This particular 
marriage certificate also states that “We, husband and wife, agree to raise our children as Muslim.”  
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death of the husband or divorce.52 The postponed mahr, in particular, serves 
an important social function and is given great weight in Islamic courts.53 
The purpose of the postponed mahr is rooted in the distinct differences 
in the position of men and women within Islamic society and law.54 Though 
men and women are considered spiritually equal, they are traditionally 
thought to nonetheless bear different social responsibilities.55 Men are 
traditionally seen as the providers of the family, and thus many women often 
do not work or have a means of independent income separate from their 
husbands.56 Again, this patriarchal cultural legacy does not stem from the 
teachings of Islam itself but rather from the historical fact that Islam arose 
in the context of seventh century society and social mores.57 
Further, women and men have different rights in divorce, as is illustrated 
by the three methods of divorce under Islamic law. The first way to dissolve 
an Islamic marriage is through a process called talaq, which, until recently, 
has been the most common method of obtaining a divorce.58 Through talaq, 
a husband can unilaterally and extra-judiciously divorce his wife by making 
a specific pronouncement or declaration of his desire to divorce.59 Some 
religious sects and countries have additional requirements, such as that a 
witness be present60 or that the pronouncement be certified by a judge.61 
However, except for these rather limited procedural requirements, the right 
to talaq divorce is traditionally quite broad and may be exercised for any 
reason.62 
A woman, on the other hand, has no such right, and her only avenue for 
initiating divorce without her husband’s consent is through a judicial 
process known as tafriq.63 Through tafriq, a wife may petition a judge for 
the dissolution of her marriage on one of a number of limited grounds, 
including spousal abuse, abandonment, or the husband’s imprisonment or 
                                                      
52. Sizemore, supra note 44, at 1087–88.  
53. Id. at 1089.  
54. See Blenkhorn, supra note 29, at 194.  
55. Id. 
56. Siddiqui, supra note 36, at 643. See also NASIR, supra note 38, at 33. 
57. See JONES-PAULY, supra note 43, at 449. 
58. NASIR, supra note 38, at 117. There is reason to believe this trend may be changing. 
Increasingly, the practice of talaq is disfavored by both Muslim and non-Muslim religious and civil 
leaders. Jeffrey Gettleman & Suhasini Raj, India’s Supreme Court Strikes Down ‘Instant Divorce’ for 
Muslims, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/world/asia/india-muslim-
divorce-triple-talaq.html?_r=0. In a widely publicized example, the Supreme Court of India declared the 
practice of talaq unlawful in August 2017. Id. 
59. Siddiqui, supra note 36, at 645.  
60. NASIR, supra note 38, at 123–24. 
61. Id. at 120, 134. 
62. See Oman, supra note 19, at 304. 
63. See NASIR, supra note 38, at 136. 
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impotency.64 In many countries, by seeking tafriq, the wife forfeits her right 
to the postponed mahr.65 
The final way that an Islamic marriage may be dissolved is by mutual 
agreement, through a process known as khula. To effect khula, the wife 
must “literally pay[] her husband for her freedom.”66 Most often this means 
forfeiting her postponed mahr,67 however, there are other ways the wife may 
pay for khula divorce. In Syria, Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait, for instance, 
an agreement by the wife to take custody of the children without requiring 
continuing maintenance from the husband is by law sufficient 
consideration.68 Further, the wife may specifically include a provision in the 
marriage contract granting her the right to khula without forfeiting her 
mahr.69 While this and other modifications to marriage contracts do occur, 
they are not the norm.70 Thus, while divorce has traditionally been 
considered a “matter of right” for men in Islamic law, it is only available for 
women in specific circumstances and, even then, usually at the cost of 
forfeiting the mahr payment.71 
In this way, a mahr provision of substantial financial value functions to 
counterbalance the husband’s right to talaq as well as his (often exclusive) 
ability to earn independent income so that in the event of talaq divorce or 
the death of the husband, the wife is left with a means of support.72 As a 
result, the mahr can and often does serve as a financial safeguard—a right 
of the wife should the marriage end without her control.73 It could also be 
argued that a substantial mahr provides somewhat of an incentive for a wife 
to remain married to her husband, lest she risk losing her financial safeguard 
by initiating divorce. Additionally, the husband may be deterred from 
initiating talaq divorce by the obligation to pay the mahr and, thus, the mahr 
often serves the larger societal goal of keeping marriages intact.74 Of course, 
this is premised on the idea that the mahr is of substantial financial value, 
                                                      
64. Id. Specific grounds may vary from state to state. For example, in Malaysia, a Muslim woman 
may seek tafriq divorce if her husband has been imprisoned for three years, is suffering from leprosy, or 
has failed to consummate the marriage within four months. Id. 
65. Oman, supra note 19, at 318 n.222. 
66. NASIR, supra note 38, at 129. 
67. Id. at 130; Sizemore, supra note 44, at 1088. 
68. NASIR, supra note 38, at 130. 
69. Estin, supra note 8, at 107. 
70. Id. 
71. See NASIR, supra note 38, at 117. 
72. Oman, supra note 19, at 302; Bleckhorn, supra note 29, at 202; Sizemore, supra note 44, at 
1088. 
73. Blenkhorn, supra note 29, at 202; Siddiqui, supra note 36, at 644. 
74. Sizemore, supra note 44, at 1099; Brian H. Bix, Marriage Agreements and Religion, 2016 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1665, 1668 (2016). 
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which, in reality, is not always the case.75 Thus, the function of the mahr 
depends on what the couple seeks to get out of it.  The mahr ultimately 
provides a means for negotiating an arrangement that ideally matches the 
financial needs of the woman in the relationship-to-be.  
Because of this important, albeit complex social function, mahr 
agreements are given great weight in Islamic courts.76 A husband cannot 
reduce the amount of the mahr and faces imprisonment if he does not 
comply with the contract as written.77 If the husband dies, the mahr is the 
most important debt in his estate and is paid before all other debts.78  
Despite the great weight given to mahr agreements in Islamic courts, 
United States courts have no consistent method of interpreting mahr 
agreements in divorces initiated in the United States.79 This confusion is due 
in large part to a misunderstanding of the context and function of the mahr, 
leading courts to improperly treat mahr agreements as prenuptial contracts, 
barring equal distribution of property in divorces initiated in the United 
States.80 A further interpretational issue arises when parties seek 
enforcement of a mahr agreement as part of a divorce obtained outside of 
the United States, specifically when the divorce was achieved through the 
unilateral method of talaq.81 Cases evince a wide range of court outcomes, 
as well as various roadblocks to enforcement of these provisions.82 This 
results in inconsistent holdings, unclear precedent, a disregard for party 
intentions, and, ultimately, a perverse incentive for either husband or wife 
to seek opportunistic enrichment.83 
II. INTERPRETATIONS OF MAHR AGREEMENTS IN U.S. COURTS 
A. Enforcement of Mahr Agreements as Prenuptial Contracts 
The majority of American courts that have addressed the issue have 
interpreted mahr agreements as prenuptial contracts, valid so long as they 
conform to requirements of contract law and the state’s statutory standards 
for prenuptials.84 Because they are entered into just prior to marriage and 
                                                      
75.  See Blenkhorn, supra note 29, at 201 (noting that “the amount of the mahr is often too small 
to act as an effective constraint on the husband in divorcing his wife, and oftentimes women are 
pressured to illustrate their devotion to their husbands by forgiving the debt of the mahr altogether”). 
76. Sizemore, supra note 44, at 1089. 
77. Id.; Blenkhorn, supra note 29, at 201. 
78. Sizemore, supra note 44, at 1089. 
79. See Siddiqui, supra note 36, at 639. See also discussion infra Part II. 
80. See infra Section II.A. 
81. See infra Section III.D. 
82. See infra Part II. 
83. See infra Part III. 
84. See Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (prenuptial, enforceable); 
Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978), (prenuptial, enforceable); Ofer v. 
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they specify what will happen in the event of the death of a spouse or 
divorce, mahr agreements in some ways look and feel like prenuptial 
contracts.85 However, upon closer inspection, the two are quite distinct. At 
the most basic level, mahr provisions and prenuptial agreements differ in 
their relation to the marriage itself. In the United States, a premarital 
agreement is thought of as conceptually separate from the marriage and 
entering a prenuptial contract is neither essential to getting married, nor does 
it legally bring a couple closer to marriage.86 On the other hand, signing an 
Islamic marriage contract, which contains a mahr agreement, is both an 
essential part of getting married and legally completes the marriage.87 
More substantively, in the United States, prenuptial contracts are defined 
as agreements entered into by two “individuals who intend to marry which 
affirms, modifies, or waives a marital right or obligation.”88 Historically, 
prenuptial contracts were considered unenforceable by American courts.89 
In the 1970s, however, as states began to adopt no-fault divorce statutes, 
many also began to permit enforcement of prenuptial contracts within 
statutorily restricted parameters.90 The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act 
(UPAA) was drafted in 1983 and has been adopted by twenty-six states and 
the District of Columbia.91 In addition to the ordinary contract requirements 
that the agreement be made voluntarily and that it not be unconscionable, 
the UPAA imposes the additional conditions that there must be adequate 
disclosure of assets and that both parties must be knowledgeable of the 
rights and privileges they are giving up—often meaning both parties must 
be represented by counsel.92 Reasons for these extra protections have to do 
                                                      
Sirota, 984 N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (prenuptial, enforceable); S.B. v. W.A., 959 N.Y.S.2d 
802 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (prenuptial, enforceable); see also In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr.2d 
863 (Ct. App. 2001) (prenuptial, unenforceable); In re Marriage of Dajani, 251 Cal. Rptr. 871 (Ct. App. 
1988) (prenuptial, unenforceable); In re Marriage of Iqbal, 11 N.E.3d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (prenuptial, 
unenforceable); Shaheen v. Khan, 142 So. 3d 257 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (prenuptial, unenforceable); 
Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489 (Md. 2008) (prenuptial, unenforceable);Farag v. Farag, 772 N.Y.S.2d 
368 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (prenuptial, unenforceable); O.Y. v A.G., 22 N.Y.S.3d 138 (Sup. Ct. 2015) 
(prenuptial, unenforceable); Zawahiri v. Alwattar, No. 07AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679 (Ohio Ct. App. 
July 10, 2008) (prenuptial, unenforceable); Ahmad v. Ahmad, 6th Dist. Lucas County No. L-00-1391, 
2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5303 (2001) (prenuptial, unenforceable). 
85. See Bix, supra note 74, at 1668. 
86. Oman, supra note 19, at 301. 
87. Id. 
88. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1(5) (2012) (emphasis added), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/premarital%20and%20marital%20agreements/2012_pmaa_fi
nal.pdf [https://perma.cc/RA42-Z6DV]. 
89. Bix, supra note 74, at 1668. 
90. Id. at 1669. 
91. Oman, supra note 19, at 321. 
92. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/premarital%20agreement/upaa_final_83.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LYV9-F465]. See, e.g., Ahmad v. Ahmad, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5303 at *11, *13–
14 (Nov. 30, 2001) (construing a Jordanian mahr agreement of $6,600 USD as a prenuptial contract and 
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with the “social script” constructed around why and how individuals enter 
into prenuptial contracts.93 These contracts are entered into just before a 
couple marries, at a time when optimism levels are high and couples 
underestimate the chance of divorce, often creating a bargaining dynamic in 
which one party, particularly a wealthier or more knowledgeable spouse, is 
incentivized to take advantage of the other party.94 Likewise, because of the 
marital property system in place in the United States, prenuptial contracts 
essentially eliminate a spouse’s right to communal or marital property and 
therefore substantially impact that spouse’s rights upon divorce.95 Thus, the 
context is thought to call for additional safeguards. 
However, this narrative does not translate to the context of mahr 
agreements.96 Importantly, the couple entering into a mahr agreement does 
not intend to bargain away property rights.97 This is because under the fiqh 
and Islamic law, there is no marital or community property system as there 
is in the United States.98 All wealth and property that an individual brings 
into a marriage continues to belong solely to that individual during and after 
the marriage.99 Thus, there is no equitable division of property upon divorce. 
However, when interpreted as a prenuptial agreement by U.S. courts, the 
mahr agreement is held to preempt other equitable division of property in 
the divorce as a prenuptial in the United States does, and thus bars the wife 
from seeking maintenance or any share of marital property.100 If enforced, 
absurd and inequitable results follow, especially when the mahr is a small 
or token amount and the marital assets are substantial. For example, in 
Chaudry v. Chaudry, the Superior Court of New Jersey upheld a divorce 
obtained in Pakistan through talaq, concluding that the postponed mahr of 
                                                      
yet holding the contract unenforceable because wife was not represented by counsel and there was no 
disclosure of husband’s assets, as required by Ohio law governing prenuptial agreements).  
93. Oman, supra note 38, at 599. 
94. Id. 
95. See Bix, supra note 74, at 1668. 
96. Oman, supra note 38, at 600. 
97. Id. This has been recognized by the drafters of the UPAA and in 2012, they promulgated a 
new set of rules, the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act (UPMAA), which in part attempts 
to distinguish between premarital contracts and “agreements that [are] entered by couples about to marry 
but that [are] not intended to affect the parties’ existing legal rights and obligations upon divorce or 
death, e.g., Islamic marriage contracts, with their deferred Mahr payment provisions.” UNIF. 
PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 2 cmt (Unif. Law Comm’n 2012), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/premarital%20and%20marital%20agreements/2012_pmaa_fi
nal.pdf [https:// perma.cc/RA42-Z6DV]. However, despite this positive development, the new rules have 
only been adopted by Colorado and North Dakota. Legislative Fact Sheet – Premarital and Marital 
Agreements Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Premarital%20and%20Marital%20Agree
ments%20Act [https://perma.cc/WG3E-9XUR]. 
98. Oman, supra note 19, at 306. 
99. Id. 
100. Blenkhorn, supra note 29, at 206. 
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$1,500 was a valid prenuptial contract.101 The court further held that, despite 
the husband’s substantial income from his work as a doctor, the wife was 
“not entitled to equitable distribution by reason of the ante nuptial 
agreement [i.e., the mahr provision], which was negotiated on her behalf by 
her parents.”102 The court’s reasoning continued that “[the agreement] could 
have lawfully provided for giving her an interest in her husband’s property, 
but it contained no such provision.”103 Thus, after fourteen years of 
marriage, substantial marital assets, and several children left in her custody, 
the wife received only her mahr of $1,500.104 
On the other hand, interpretation of the mahr as a prenuptial contract can 
also be a windfall for the wife when it allows her to receive a substantial 
postponed mahr, even though marital assets are small. For example, in 
Akileh v. Elchalal, the Florida Court of Appeals interpreted a $50,000 
deferred mahr provision that was part of a thirteen-month Florida marriage 
as a prenuptial agreement and held that the agreement was valid despite the 
relatively small marital assets and the husband’s personal belief that his wife 
forfeited the mahr if she initiated the divorce.105 
Regardless of whether the court enforces the mahr agreement as a 
prenuptial contract or strikes it down as unenforceable, and regardless of 
whether the husband or the wife benefits from this holding, the 
interpretation of mahr agreements as prenuptial agreements is 
fundamentally flawed. More than anything, the decisions resulting from this 
interpretation “show that when lower courts do not understand the precise 
nature of a religious provision, they often reach for a secular tool that bears 
very little resemblance to the religious article, resulting in interpretations 
that do not reflect the parties’ intent.”106 
B. Enforcement of Mahr Agreements as Basic Civil Contracts 
Other courts have declined to interpret mahr agreements as specialized 
prenuptial contracts, but instead view them as basic civil contracts, leaving 
open the opportunity for both enforcement of the mahr agreement and 
                                                      
101. Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000, 1003 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). 
102. Id. at 1006. 
103. Id. Cf. In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr.2d 863 (Ct. App. 2001) (husband argued, and 
court agreed, that $30 mahr agreement was a prenuptial contract between husband and wife married for 
over seventeen years; court, however, held the prenuptial was not enforceable on grounds of vagueness). 
104. Chaudry, 388 A.2d at 1006. 
105. Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246, 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). In this case, the husband 
had given his new wife genital warts. Id. at 247. Though not stated explicitly by the court, perhaps this 
sympathetic fact scenario factored into its interpretation of the mahr, which was highly favorable to the 
wife. See id. 
106. Shiva Falsafi, Religion, Women, and the Holy Grail of Legal Pluralism, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1881, 1884 (2014). 
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equitable distribution of property and alimony dispositions.107 In Odatalla 
v. Odatalla, for example, a wife sought enforcement of a $10,000 mahr 
agreement signed as part of her and her husband’s New Jersey marriage in 
which the entire ceremony, including negotiation of the mahr, was recorded 
on film.108 The Superior Court of New Jersey held that the mahr agreement 
was “nothing more and nothing less than a simple contract between two 
consenting adults.”109  
Though this interpretation aligns with U.S. contract law, it too ignores 
the context of mahr agreements in Islamic marriages. Particularly in the 
cases of marriages entered abroad, but arguably in the case of marriages 
entered into in the United States as well, the parties’ intent was likely not to 
enter into a basic civil contract made with U.S. civil law mandating 
equitable division of property in the background.110 Instead, their 
conception of the mahr was likely informed by their understanding of the 
treatment of marriage within the Islamic religious and legal tradition, 
particularly laws designating the different types of divorce and property 
distribution.111 Simply upholding all mahr agreements that appear to meet 
basic contract requirements creates an incentive for the wife to benefit both 
from secular marital property laws and Islamic traditions created in a system 
that does not recognize marital property at all. In other words, blanket 
enforcement of mahr under simple contract law in some ways may be 
equally as problematic as designating them prenuptial contracts. 
III. ISSUES OF ENFORCEMENT OF MAHR AGREEMENTS IN U.S. COURTS 
A. Void for Vagueness 
Whether the mahr is interpreted as a basic civil contract or a prenuptial 
agreement, it may be unenforceable on grounds of vagueness for violating 
either the statute of frauds or contract certainty requirements.112 If issues of 
interpretation of terms arise, courts will allow parol evidence to shed light 
on the intentions of the parties, however, not to the extent that the contract 
itself becomes the “product” of parol evidence.113 Mahr agreements rarely 
                                                      
107. See, e.g., Aziz v. Aziz, 488 N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); Lashgari v. Lashgari, 
496 A.2d 491, 493, 496 (Conn. 1985) (referring to mahr as part of basic contract and acknowledging 
issue in case is “claim in contract for damages”). 
108. Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002). 
109. Id. 
110. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. 
111. See supra notes 58–71, 95–98 and accompanying text. 
112. Siddiqui, supra note 36, at 652–53. 
113. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 865 (Ct. App. 2001) (upholding 
exclusion of parol evidence offered by husband to show that since the mahr was made in accordance 
with “Islamic Law” it was intended to preclude all equitable division of property because “[a]n 
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define the terms that they use, creating further interpretational issues.114 
Courts vary in the level of vagueness they will allow, and in their acceptance 
of parol evidence. For example, in Odatalla v. Odatalla, the Superior Court 
of New Jersey rejected a husband’s argument that the mahr provision 
containing the word “postponed” next to the amount of the mahr was too 
vague and held that parol evidence was admissible to explain the meaning 
of the term “postponed.”115 However, in In re Marriage of Obaidi v. 
Qayoum, the Washington Court of Appeals came to the opposite conclusion, 
holding a mahr agreement that read “Long term marriage portion: 20,000.00 
Dollars” void for vagueness because there was “no term explaining why or 
when the $20,000 would be paid.”116 
B. Void as Against Basic Contract Principles 
Whether interpreted as a prenuptial agreement or a basic contract, courts 
routinely hold that the mahr agreement must conform to principles of public 
policy.117 If the terms of the mahr agreement are so one-sided as to be 
unconscionable, or there is evidence that one party has not freely contracted 
and thus there was no true meeting of minds, a court may find the mahr 
unenforceable as against public policy.118 For example, in In re Marriage of 
Iqbal, the Appellate Court of Illinois held that a post-nuptial agreement 
entered into by a husband and wife was unenforceable because it violated 
public policy by designating a specified arbiter with the power to determine 
custody of the couple’s children without the obligation to act in the best 
interests of the children, and it favored the husband so strongly as to be 
substantively unconscionable.119 Courts have also struck down mahr 
agreements when there is evidence of duress120 or coercion.121 
                                                      
agreement whose only substantive term in any language is that the marriage has been made in accordance 
with ‘Islamic Law’ is hopelessly uncertain as to its terms and conditions”); Habibi-Fahnrich v. Fahnrich, 
No. 46186/93, 1995 WL 507388 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 10, 1995) (finding mahr that awarded wife half of 
husband’s “possessions” unenforceable, in part because the term “possessions” was too vague).  
114. See Appendix for an example of a typical mahr agreement and terms used within. 
115. Odatalla, 810 A.2d at 98. 
116. In re Marriage of Obaidi, 226 P.3d 787, 791 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). 
117. Blenkhorn, supra note 29, at 225–26. 
118. Id. See, e.g., Ahmad v. Ahmad, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5303 at *14 (Nov. 30, 2001) 
(affirming lower court holding that divorce violated Ohio public policy because it was “devoid of notice 
and opportunity to be heard”). 
119. In re Marriage of Iqbal, 11 N.E.3d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). 
120. See In re Marriage of Obaidi, 226 P.3d at 791 (mahr held void in part because husband did 
not know about the mahr until fifteen minutes before signing and the mahr was in farsi which husband 
did not read or write). 
121. Zawahiri v. Alwattar, No. 07AP-925, 2008 WL 2698679, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2008) 
(invalidating mahr and finding a presumption of overreaching or coercion because the mahr agreement 
was presented to the husband for the first time on the day of the wedding ceremony). 
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C. Mahr Agreements and First Amendment Entanglement Issues: Neutral 
Principles of Law Doctrine 
A potential constitutional constraint on the enforcement of mahr 
agreements that courts have grappled with is the Establishment Clause, 
which mandates that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”122 In 
Jones v. Wolf, the Supreme Court held that “neutral principles of law” may 
be applied to resolve issues arising in a religious context so long as there is 
no fundamental issue of religious practice or doctrinal controversy 
involved.123 In 1983, the highest court of New York applied Jones in the 
context of a Jewish marriage contract in Avitzur v. Avitzur, holding that the 
secular terms of the contract were enforceable without reference to any 
religious principle.124 The court noted, “[t]he fact that the agreement was 
entered into as part of a religious ceremony does not render it 
unenforceable.”125 Despite arguments that Islamic marriage contracts are 
purely religious documents, many courts have held in the vein of Avitzur 
that enforcement of secular terms of an Islamic marriage contract does not 
violate the “neutral principles of law” doctrine.126 
However, when key issues in the case turn on a court deciding between 
various schools of Islamic religious doctrine, some courts have found that 
enforcement or interpretation of the contract violates constitutional limits. 
For example, in In re Marriage of Obaidi, the Court of Appeals of 
Washington found that the trial court erred in analyzing whether the wife 
had done anything to forfeit her mahr under Islamic law before holding that 
she was entitled to payment of the mahr.127 The court of appeals reasoned, 
“[a]pplying the neutral principles of contract law, we can resolve this case 
by using these neutral principles of law, not Islamic beliefs or policies.”128  
However, at least one commentator has argued that reference to Islamic 
law to determine the meaning of a mahr agreement does not violate the 
                                                      
122. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
123. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 597 (1979). 
124. Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983). 
125. Id. at 139. 
126. See, e.g., Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002) (“If this Court 
can apply ‘neutral principles of law’ to the enforcement of a Mahr Agreement, though religious in 
appearance, then the Mahr Agreement survives any constitutional implications.”); Aziz v. Aziz, 488 
N.Y.S.2d 123, 124 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (holding that a deferred mahr agreement of $5,000 conformed to the 
requirements of New York contract law and, thus, the agreement’s secular terms were enforceable as a 
contractual obligation, even though it was entered into as part of a religious ceremony). 
127. In re Marriage of Obaidi, 226 P.3d 787 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010). But see Rahman v. Hossain, 
No. A-5191-08T3, 2010 WL 4075316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 17, 2010) (holding that the wife 
must refund her prompt mahr payment because, under Islamic law, she was at fault in precipitating the 
divorce and was thus not entitled to the mahr). 
128. In re Marriage of Obaidi, 226 P.3d at 790. 
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neutral principals of law doctrine.129 Instead, the author compares the 
application by courts of particular aspects of Islamic law to the application 
of foreign law under choice of law principles.130 The author notes, “[s]o 
long as [they are] being asked to construe the meaning of the mahr as a 
matter of social fact courts do not violate [the neutral principles of law] 
doctrine, even if in determining social fact they must look to the fiqh.”131 
D. Enforcement of Mahr Agreements in Divorces Obtained Abroad: Issues 
of International Comity 
A related issue arises when courts are asked to enforce mahr agreements 
that are part of divorces obtained abroad. Faced with this scenario, 
American courts must determine whether the agreement should be upheld 
on grounds of international comity under choice of law principles.132 Here, 
as well, courts diverge. When the foreign divorce has upheld the payment 
of a mahr that appears relatively fair to both parties, courts are more likely 
to enforce the foreign divorce.133 In these instances, courts generally explain 
their reasoning by stating that the mahr does not contravene any public 
policy. For example, as the court in Odatalla noted, “the Mahr Agreement 
continues a custom and tradition that is unique to a certain segment of our 
current society and is not at war with any public morals.”134 However, where 
the foreign divorce was obtained through talaq, courts are reticent to enforce 
an unfavorable mahr agreement as a prenuptial contract that bars equitable 
division of property.135 Courts here use strong language reflecting a public 
policy standpoint. For example, the court in Soleimani criticized the 
decision in Chaudry, noting “flawed reasoning was utilized in [Chaudry] to 
                                                      
129. Oman, supra note 19, at 324–27. 
130. Id. at 326. 
131. Id. 
132. See, e.g., S.B. v. W.A., 959 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Sup. Ct. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Badawi v. Wael 
Munir Alesawy, 24 N.Y.S.3d 683 (App. Div. 2016). 
133. See id. (upholding a divorce obtained in the United Arab Emirates granting wife $250,000 
mahr, custody, and other alimony upon “considerations of international comity” because no strong 
public policy would be violated by the recognition, entry, or enforcement of the foreign judgment 
upholding the mahr agreement). 
134. Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002). 
135. See, e.g., Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489 (Md. 2008) (foreign divorce decree not upheld 
where parties lived in Maryland for twenty years and husband performed talaq divorce at Pakistani 
consulate); Tarikonda v. Pinjari, No. 287403, 2009 WL 930007 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009) (foreign 
divorce decree not upheld where husband travelled to India to perform talaq divorce and wife filed for 
divorce in Michigan); Farag v. Farag, 772 N.Y.S.2d 368 (App. Div. 2004) (foreign divorce decree not 
upheld where husband travelled to Egypt without wife’s knowledge to secure divorce decree); Ahmad 
v. Ahmad, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5303 (Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2001) (foreign divorce decree not upheld 
where parties lived in U.S. but husband travelled to Jordan to perform talaq divorce). But see Chaudry 
v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (foreign divorce decree upheld where 
parties had lived in New Jersey but relocated to Pakistan and husband obtained divorce in Pakistan 
through talaq). 
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justify upholding a premarital contract derived from Pakistani law, on 
choice of law grounds, rather than on public policy grounds.”136 The result, 
the court continued, “was judicial adoption of Pakistani law that inherently 
accords women no marital property rights.”137 
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTION: ESTABLISHMENT OF ISLAMIC ARBITRATION 
TRIBUNALS IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. A Pluralist Perspective: Jewish Beth Din Courts as an Example for 
Islamic Organizations to Emulate 
As the above discussion indicates, specific circumstances surrounding 
the litigation of mahr agreements in U.S. courts are extremely varied, as are 
judicial treatments of them.138 The cases result in inconsistent holdings, 
creating unclear precedent that both undercuts the true intentions of the 
parties and creates incentives for both parties to bend the law in their favor. 
At the same time, the number of cases involving mahr agreements has 
risen since the early 2000s and this trend shows few signs of stopping.139 
Commentators have offered various suggestions for judges to correct these 
interpretational issues, from enforcing all mahr agreements as basic 
contracts,140 to refusing to enforce any mahr agreement to encourage the 
Muslim community to write clearer, more specific marriage contracts.141 
However, these solutions all start from the common misconception that in 
the United States, marriage and divorce, and hence the interpretation of 
mahr agreements, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of family law and the 
civil courts.142 Yet, when a marriage contract that does not fit neatly within 
the boundaries of American civil law reaches the courts, it becomes clear 
that the “uniform application of a single set of laws” may not always be the 
best approach.143 As one commentator notes, it is also neither “historically 
mandated”144 nor ubiquitous within “the international community.”145 
Perhaps better, more consistent outcomes can be achieved by 
“acknowledg[ing] that there are multiple sources of normative ordering in 
                                                      
136. Soleimani v. Soleimani, No. 11CV4668, 2012 WL 3729939, ¶ 29 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Aug. 28, 
2012). 
137. Id. 
138. See supra Part II. 
139. Asifa Quraishi & Najeeba Syeed-Miller, No Altars: A Survey of Islamic Family Law in the 
United States, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS & ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 207 (Lynn Welchman ed., 2009). 
140. Oman, supra note 19, at 334; Siddiqui, supra note 36, at 658. 
141. Sizemore, supra note 44, at 1106–08. 
142. Joel A. Nichols, Multi-Tiered Marriage: Reconsidering the Boundaries of Civil Law and 
Religion, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT supra note 8, at 11, 15–16. 
143. Id. at 13. 
144. Id. at 13, 15–19. 
145. Id. at 13, 32–58. 
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every society”146 and embracing a view of legal pluralism, which recognizes 
that every society has both an official legal system but also what is termed 
“unofficial law.”147 Within the family law context, unofficial law includes 
formal religious tribunals as well as religious rules and customs, all of which 
have an effect on individuals and the way they live and order their lives, 
even if they do not have the weight of binding legal authority.148 
The reality, as the mahr cases show, is that legal pluralism already 
exists.149 Family law is becoming more global and judges are already 
grappling with the rules and ordering of unofficial law within their 
courtrooms.150 Not only does the cultural reality of the United States 
demand pluralism within its conception of marriage and divorce, but there 
is also strong precedent for this set by the Jewish community within the 
United States through their use of arbitration clauses and rabbinical 
tribunals.151 
Founded in 1960, Beth Din of America (BDA) is “a sprawling network 
of Jewish law courts that function as arbitration panels” with the goal of 
serving a Jewish community in America that seeks to live in accordance 
with both religious and secular law.152 In 1996, after years of being viewed 
with skepticism by civil courts and receiving fairly regular reversals on their 
rulings, BDA sought to transform itself by bringing itself into compliance 
with the Federal Arbitration Act and creating an arbitration process that civil 
courts would recognize as legitimate.153 BDA made various internal 
changes, including issuing standardized procedural rules, providing an 
internal appellate process, developing choice-of-law procedure to 
accommodate religious and secular law where possible, and employing 
Jewish scholars as well as arbitrators, lawyers, and other professionals who 
were experts in secular law.154 As a result of these changes, the BDA has 
received widespread and nearly unanimous acceptance among American 
civil courts.155 Since these reforms were implemented, not one BDA 
decision has been overturned.156 The success of BDA in America, as one 
commentator noted, has been fundamental in “establish[ing] a framework 
                                                      
146. McClain, supra note 33, at 309. 
147. Id. at 310. 
148. Id. See also Estin, supra note 8, at 95–97. 
149. McClain, supra note 33, at 309. 
150. Id. 
151. See Michael J. Broyde, Jewish Law Courts in America: Lessons Offered to Sharia Courts by 
the Beth Din of America Precedent, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 287 (2012-2013); See also infra notes 153–
159 and accompanying text. 
152. Broyde, supra note 151, at 288. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 288–89. 
155. Id. at 288. 
156. Id. 
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for interaction between secular and religious courts.”157 A “new model has 
emerged in which religious courts or clergy function as arbitrators to resolve 
marriage and divorce disputes. After arbitration, one member of the couple 
may bring the settlement or judgment to a secular court for enforcement as 
an arbitration award.”158 
The model that BDA used to establish itself as a legitimate authority, 
both for its own Jewish community and for civil courts, should be emulated 
by those seeking to interpret and enforce Islamic marriage contracts, 
including the mahr provisions within them, in a manner consistent with 
Islamic culture, law, and religious practices. Not only would this allow the 
Islamic community to establish its own practices within the parameters of 
secular law in the United States, but it would also help to promote 
acceptance and a more nuanced understanding of Islamic family law among 
judges within United States courts, and, hopefully, in turn, within American 
society more broadly. 
B. Concerns about a Pluralist Approach 
Despite the successful precedent set by the BDA and the promise this 
approach holds for American Muslims, there are still serious concerns to be 
considered before civil courts cede jurisdiction to religious arbitrators. On 
a practical level, the current political and social moment presents a 
particularly challenging environment for the ideal discussed above. Since 
2010, some 201 anti-Sharia law bills have been introduced in fourty-three 
states and fourteen have been enacted.159 In 2017 alone, fourteen states 
introduced such bills, with Texas and Arkansas being the most recent states 
to enact bills into legislation.160 Anti-Sharia laws are not explicitly labelled 
as such, and they do not actually change the law in any real way (the United 
States Constitution already does what they purport to do).161 However, the 
movement has created a climate in which Muslims and Islamic law in 
particular are viewed with, at best, suspicion and, at worst, fear and 
hatred.162 
Beyond these practical issues, however, lie legitimate conerns that 
ceding authority could undercut values that currently exist within American 
civil family law.163 For example, there is a concern that civil law principles 
                                                      
157. Estin, supra note 8, at 106. 
158. Id. 
159. Anti-Sharia Law Bills in the United States, S. POVERTY LAW CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), https:// 
www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/08/08/anti-sharia-law-bills-united-states. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. See supra discussion of Establishment Clause jurisprudence in Section III.C. 
162. S. POVERTY LAW CENTER, supra note 159. 
163. McClain, supra note 33, at 311. 
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of no-fault divorce would not be respected, that the idea of marriage as an 
equal partnership premised on gender-neutral and reciprocal rights and 
obligations would be diminished.164 In this vein, feminist commentators 
have raised concerns that adoption of a pluralist system would inadequately 
protect the rights of women.165 As one author noted, a “system that relegates 
religious women to the primary or exclusive jurisdiction of religious 
tribunals is not likely to facilitate [] dissent [that contests the most 
patriarchal interpretations of religious and family law], by contrast to a 
jurisdictional model that attempts to secure women’s rights both as 
members of religious communities and as citizens.”166 
However, it is important to note that the current system already provides 
analogous ways to opt out of certain protective rules in the marital context 
and engage, instead, in private ordering.167 In some ways, the proposition to 
allow individuals to privately resolve disputes somewhat out of the purview 
of the court is not novel. One example that has already been discussed in 
this Note is the prenuptial contract.168 Despite the civil court system’s early 
suspicion towards, and invalidation of, prenuptial contracts, once 
appropriate protections were put in place that guaranteed informed choice 
in the process, courts began to view these as valid and enforceable 
contracts.169 Instead of denying the need for prenuptial agreements 
altogether, the law has taken a realistic approach that acknowledges that 
individuals want and have a legitimate need to enter into these contracts.170 
By adding safeguards that protect the individuals and ensure basic rights, 
the system accommodates this type of private ordering and encourages 
freedom of choice. 
A similar approach should be taken with Islamic marriage contracts by 
allowing Islamic tribunals to arbitrate marriage disputes when the parties so 
desire. Allowing decisions made by Islamic arbitration tribunals to carry 
binding weight—so long as the tribunal itself is in compliance with Federal 
Arbitration Act and meets other appropriate standards—in no way precludes 
the civil family law system from exercising jurisdiction over these issues. 
On the contrary, “arbitration is not a parallel system, but a method of 
alternative dispute resolution that is subject to judicial oversight, and is thus 
subordinate to the court system.”171 
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167. Id. at 312. 
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INCLUSION, (2004), https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/executivesum 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
172 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 96:153 
 
 
 
Still, other commentators reject the analogy of religious arbitration as 
private ordering akin to freedom of contract.172 They argue that there is more 
pressure, particularly for women, in religious matters than in financial 
matters.173 One author notes, “a liberal model that recognizes agency by 
allowing choice, even incorrect ones, puts a high premium on fostering 
informed choice.”174 Though this is true, it ignores the capability of courts 
to continue to require that a baseline of basic rights be protected. Further, 
additional requirements that help ensure informed choice can be put into 
place that go beyond what is currently required.175 
This criticism also ignores the reality that even without official Islamic 
arbitrators that are recognized by civil courts, Islamic individuals in the 
United States already participate in this private ordering and so-called 
unofficial law. Research suggests that “members of [Islamic] communities 
generally follow official marriage and divorce laws in order to have their 
family status recognized by the state, but that they also utilize unofficial law 
mediated by ecclesiastical courts, rabbinic tribunals, or Muslim dispute 
resolution centers.”176 These arbital decisions are currently not given the 
weight of official enforcement, but they are also not subject to any 
safeguards, oversight, or protection.177 Reports have surfaced of arbitrary, 
sexist opinions from unregulated arbitrators, particularly in Britain, which 
boasts a large Muslim population and several Islamic arbitration tribunals 
with varying levels of transparency and legitimacy.178 A complete rejection 
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of any pluralist system, then, in some ways provides less protection for 
individuals who might be vulnerable to community pressure to participate 
in “unofficial” arbitration forums.179 In other words, a complete rejection of 
any concept of shared jurisdiction “may instead thrust these tribunals 
underground where no state regulation, coordination, or legal recourse is 
made available to those who may need it most.”180 
C. Benefits of a Pluralist Approach 
One benefit of permitting some interaction between civil courts and 
Islamic arbitration tribunals is that it allows for greater oversight to ensure 
protection of basic rights. As the example of BDA suggests, embracing a 
pluralist scheme also encourages self-regulation by the religious arbital 
body itself to come into conformity with the standards of U.S. civil law, 
including standardized procedural rules, fair appellate processes, and 
fundamental rights of due process and equal protection under the law.181 
This, in turn, incentivizes religious arbitrators to become familiar with 
tenets of American civil law and cultivates a “dual-system fluency.”182 Over 
time, this may lead to new interpretations of religious and cultural norms 
and a plurality of practices even within these traditions.183 If such a system 
were employed in Islamic law matters, not only would American judges 
become more familiar and comfortable with basic tenets of Islamic law, but 
so too would Islamic arbitrators with American law. 
On a more basic level, a pluralist approach to Islamic arbitration would 
validate and recognize that there is “more than one conception of marriage 
and divorce” within American society.184 In America, there is a pervasive 
notion that our system of civil law is culturally and religiously neutral.185 Of 
course, the reality is that this is far from the truth.186 Recognition that our 
official family law is not culturally neutral is fundamental to creating a 
society in which diversity of culture, beliefs, and marriage and divorce 
practices are allowed to exist. 
                                                      
L4-8JJV]; Jean Mackenzie & Adam Eley, The UK Women Seeking Divorce Through Sharia Councils, 
BBC NEWS (July 11, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-36587665  [https://perma.cc/WCV3-4MVF]; 
Frances Perraudin, Muslim Women ‘Used as Political Footballs in Sharia Court Debate, GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/nov/01/muslim-women-used-as-political-
footballs-in-sharia-court-debate  [https://perma.cc/U384-QFE9]. 
179. McClain, supra note 33, at 343. 
180. Id. 
181. See discussion supra Section IV.A. 
182. Broyde, supra note 151, at 300. 
183. Estin, supra note 8, at 118. 
184. Nichols, supra note 142, at 13. 
185. McClain, supra note 33, at 317.  
186. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
174 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 96:153 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
When it comes to mahr agreements within Islamic marriage contracts, it 
is easy to see how such a pluralist system would create both more consistent 
results and results more in line with parties’ intentions and religious beliefs. 
Instead of investing time grappling with varying and unfamiliar Islamic 
religious practices, courts would play an oversight role, ensuring the 
protection of the fundamental rights central to our civil system of law. In 
turn, this would empower the American Muslim community to determine 
its own course through self-regulation and to align itself with core tenets of 
American civil law. Finally, this system would help end the pervasive and 
misplaced fear of the Islamic religion and foster a more nuanced 
understanding of Islamic family law within American society. 
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